International Journal on Advanced Science Engineering Information Technology

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XGBoost Classifier for DDOS Attack Detection in Software Defined Network Using sFlow Protocol

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Abstract— From a security perspective, Software Defined Network (SDN) separates security concerns into Control Plane and Data Plane. The Control Plane is responsible for managing the entire network centrally. Centralized SDN generates high vulnerability against the Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS). When the Software Defined Network overwhelms by DDOS, both Control Plane and Data Plane will lack resources. It can cause the SDN to fail to work if not detected early. Using the ability of sFlow Protocol to capture the flow traffic in real time, the data could be used to detect DDOS attacks. This sFlow sampling approach can reduce the workload of the network by lower down the processing in switches. This paper uses Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost), Support Vector Machine (SVM), and Random Forest as detection methods. We use ONOS as SDN Controller and build the topology in GNS3. Prometheus retrieves data from the sFlow Collector as a time series database. The classifier then uses the data from Prometheus for DDOS detection. For the dataset, we use four different datasets. Datasets 1 and 2 consist of 6109 data, each divided into two classes and three classes. Datasets 3 and 4 consist of 400488 data divided into 2 and 3 classes, respectively. The evaluation results have proved the effectiveness of the proposed method. XGBoost has the highest accuracy of another algorithm. The best accuracy is 99.84% using Dataset 4 as the training set.

Keywords- Software defined network; sFlow; distributed denial of service; extreme gradient boosting.

Manuscript received 24 May 2022; revised 7 Nov. 2022; accepted 5 Jan. 2023. Date of publication 30 Apr. 2023. IJASEIT is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 4.0 International License.

I. INTRODUCTION

The main challenges in developing computer networks are to build a smart network architecture to simplify activation and adjustments to support increasingly diverse application needs. However, traditional networks are less relevant to supporting applications efficiently and massively [1]–[5]. SDN separates security concerns into Control Plane and Data Plane. This Control Plane is responsible for managing the entire network centralized on a controller that maintains the whole network so that it is easier to design and operate the network through a logical point. A centralized Control Plane in Software Defined Network (SDN) generates high vulnerability against the Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS) attack. In case of no early detection of this attack, the system immediately reduces the performances of the control plane, data plane, and secure channel between them. In the worst case, it can make SDN fail to work [6]-[8].

The research on DDOS attack detection on SDN is still ongoing to find an effective method. There are several techniques to detect DDOS in SDN, such as entropy-based [9]–[11], connection rate [12], [13], probabilistic [14], traffic pattern analysis [15], and machine learning based. According to Yan et al. [2], one of the effective methods is a machine learning based. The capability of centralized control of the entire node makes implementing big data analytics for attack detection effective. SDN will come to a new stage in proactive, intelligent systems with big data analytics and artificial intelligence.

Most machine learning in SDN uses packets sent from the switch to the controller for control, not traffic monitoring. Those control packets are only sent under certain conditions, and when used continuously, will make high utility of resources [16]–[18]. Furthermore, [19]–[21] creates a module to send control packets for certain intervals to all the switches to get statistical data from the switch. It can use the switch resources, which can be used for forwarding purposes. For the same reason, then [22]–[24] improves to reduce the resource

utility using the sFlow protocol, which can monitor packets on the switch with a sampling technique. In a previous study [22], the research proposes a new sampling technique, Adaptive Polling Sampling. The sFlow sampling protocol method, which has become the industry standard, got better results. sFlow protocol with sampling technique will reduce the load of the network. In addition, the sFlow makes the attack detection more modular, and the network scalability would be better. However, the classification method [22], SAE (Stacked Autoencoder), which belong to unsupervised learning, is not performing better than other paper with supervised learning methods [18], [20], [25]. Unsupervised learning provides convenience by not labeling the dataset, usually used to recognize the similarity of data patterns through clustering. Nevertheless, Supervised Learning would obtain more accurate results regarding data classification whose data class is known.

This paper focuses on classifying DDOS attacks using sFlow as a data source. The data is used from the sFlow Collector as it receives sFlow packets. The combination of DDOS detection in SDN using sFlow to reduce the load and apply the Supervised Learning method to improve classification performance. The supervised learning method applied is Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost). XGBoost is an ensemble learning method. The method has more than one classifier to minimize false negatives (error prediction). For the comparison, we also use Random Forest, which is ensemble learning and Support Vector Machine.

In this paper, we first describe the architecture of SDN. The structural characteristics of the controller will make it vulnerable to DDoS attacks. Then, referring to the simulation tools [26], we use GNS3 for emulating network topology, ONOS [27] as a controller to build our system model, and use Hping3, SlowLoris, and GoldenEye for performing an attack, and Cisco TRex [28] for generating benign traffic. SFlow-RT collects the sampling flow traffic as the sFlow Collector, while Prometheus will get and save the data from sFlow-RT. Finally, the algorithms are used as the detection method. Compared with other classifiers, the DDoS attack detection results show that XGBoost performs more accurately than others. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, Materials and Methods, we introduce the SDN's architecture as well as our system model and implementation. The Section III, Results and Discussion, we discuss the evaluation of our model as well as the data training. We have implemented our method in SDN environment and compare it with other classifiers also in this section. In Section IV, we conclude this paper

II. MATERIAL AND METHOD

This section discusses the SDN architecture and the vulnerability against DDOS attacks. Our system model and implementation are also explained in this section.

A. SDN Architecture

Open Networking Foundation (ONF) [29] develops the SDN architecture, where network administrators can manage network services centrally. The SDN's programmatic features allow the network administrator to manipulate the network states and configuration with less effort.

SDN architecture separates into three layers: Application, Control, and Infrastructure. This architecture is shown in Fig 1. *Application Layer* is an interface used to manage or develop a SDN Network. Communicate with Control Layer using North Bound Interface (NBI) in this layer. The control Layer is a centralized controller and software-based used to control function and forwarding monitoring. *Infrastructure Layer has network elements used to run* the switching and forwarding packet function. The interface between Controller Plane and Data Plane is called SouthBound Interface (SBI) or Controlto-Data-Plane Interface (CDPI).




Fig. 1 Software Defined Network Architecture

B. DDOS Attack in SDN

The idea of SDN is separate between Control Plane and Data Plane. The controller is software in Control Plane, which acts as decision maker and is responsible for managing the entire network. It makes it easier to design and operate the network through a logical point. In Data Plane there are network devices such as a switch connected with Controller via OpenFlow protocol. It performs packet forwarding according to the flow table defined by the controller. As shown in Fig 2, when a new packet arrives at the switch, it will look up the flow table if there is a matching entry, as shown by arrow (1). If the flow matches, it will forward to the destination accordingly, as shown by (5). However, if the first packet to the destination is not found in the flow table, the switch will send the packet to SDN Controller as a packet, as shown by (2). The controller then will look up its flow table to see if the rule is matched. If it matches, the controller will send back a new rule to the switch, and the switch will be stored in its flow table for any subsequent packet with the same flow (shown as arrow (3) in the diagram).




Fig. 2 Packet forwarding in SDN

The DDOS attacks could randomly generate a huge number of malicious packets and could not match the switch flow table, resulting in a large packet sent to the controller. This could overwhelm the control channel and exhaust controller resources [4]. The lack of resources will make the controller unable to process the legitimate requirement, and this threat could make the controller fail to serve normal users. An attacker may impersonate the controller to steal user information or initiate a much more attack during this time. This DDOS attack can impact various places in SDN network. Three main possible places are the data plane, the control plane, and the secure channel between the control and data plane [30].




Fig. 3 Proposed system implementation

C. System Model and Implementation

In this paper, the system shown in Fig 3 runs on GNS3 emulator. The red line figured Control Plane path and the black line was Data Plane. We use ONOS as the SDN Controller as it is more modern, modular, and scalable [31]. This experiment will save the data directly from sFlow-RT (Collector) to Prometheus, so the saved data is the data from sFlow Collector. In addition to reducing computer utility, using sFlow-RT and Prometheus make the system more modular. Prometheus is an open-source time series database optimized for gathering large volumes of metrics [32]. We use sFlow-RT as the sFlow Collector, which has all the network traffic data from the sFlow Agent sampling results. The data can be accessed via REST API. Prometheus then gets the data from sFlow-RT every second to be stored in the database.

We use Cisco TRex tools with Advanced Stateful (ASTF) operating mode to generate normal traffic. TRex is an opensource, customizable packet generator tool that can be used to test firewalls and load balancing, as it can concurrently construct packets in multiple streams. In ASTF mode, it allows the tool to work stateful. It can perform TCP communication while monitoring the reply from the server if the TCP session has not ended. One of the advantages of using this advanced stateful mode is being able to emulate connections until the application layer, such as HTTP, DNS, DHCP, etc. This paper uses two hosts for the TRex tool to be configured as a server and a client. The tools for attack traffic run on the client side while there is an Apache2 web server using default configuration on the server. Use GoldenEye, SlowLoris (Application Layer Attack), and Hping3 (Protocol Layer Attack) for DDOS attack tools. The detail of the tools runs on the client and server host are shown in Fig 4.




Fig. 4 Used tools in client and server host

The IP address on the attacker's computer and web server (DDOS target) using the /8 subnet accommodates the T-Rex tool to generate normal traffic. TRex will generate traffic with source IP network 16.0.0.0/8 and destination IP network 48.0.0.0/8. In ONOS as the SDN controller, routing is added to make the two networks can be connected to each other. Besides the routing, we need to activate the Reactive Routing application in ONOS. This reactive routing application will create a virtual gateway. Hosts in a legacy IP network use the

gateway as the default router to access the Internet. However, an SDN network uses SDN switches to connect a network rather than routers, so the SDN network has no physical gateway router. Without a gateway, there is an issue for hosts inside SDN network. When hosts want to communicate with other hosts in different subnetworks, they do not know the next hop where the packets should be sent. Also, hosts do not know the MAC address of the next hop and cannot compose the entire packet and send it out.

| TABLE I The datasets detail | | | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|---------|---------|----------------|---------|--------|---------------------|----------|--|
| Deternt | Prometheus | Classes | | Number of Data | | | | | |
| Dataset | Pool Interval | Classes | Label 0 | Label 1 | Label 2 | Total | Training Set | Test Set | |
| Dataset 1 | 1 minute | 2 | 3280 | 2829 | - | 6109 | 4887 | 1222 | |
| Dataset 2 | 1 minute | 3 | 3280 | 1629 | 1200 | 6109 | 400/ | | |
| Dataset 3 | 1 second | 2 | 202533 | 197955 | - | 400488 | 320390 | 80098 | |
| Dataset 4 | 1 second | 3 | 202533 | 127078 | 70877 | 400488 | 520390 | 00098 | |

D. Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost)

Extreme Gradient Boosting (XGBoost) is the learning method to solve regression and classification problems based on the Gradient Boosting Decision Tree (GDBT). In, XGBoost is an improved GDBPT, generating boosted trees efficiently and operating in parallel [33]. XGBoost uses gradient descent to minimize errors when creating new models. Gradient Boosting starts with loading the model into the data specified in Eq (1).

$$F_1(x) = y \tag{1}$$

Furthermore, the results from the model are used to calculate the residuals in the previous process, which is given by Eq. (2). Then a new model is created as written in Eq. (3). The final model is obtained from a combination of n iteration models to produce the smallest error value from the residual. The final model can be defined in Eq. (4)

$$h_1(x) = y - F_1(x)$$
 (2)

$$F_2(x) = F_1(x) + h_1(x)$$
(3)

$$\begin{aligned} (x) &= F_1(x) \to F_2(x) = F_1(x) + h_1(x) \dots \\ &\to F_M(x) \\ &= F_{M-1}(x) + h_{M-1}(x) \end{aligned}$$
 (4)

The final model from Boosting which can be written in Eq. (5)

$$f(x) = \gamma_0 + \sum_{m=1}^{M} \gamma_m h_m(x)$$
(5)

where $f_x = \gamma_0$ and $f_m(x) = \gamma_m h_m(x)$ for m = 1,2,3, ... Mwith the value $h_m(x) \in \{-1,1\}$

The final goal of this process is to obtain the closest function $\hat{F}(x)$ to f(x) by reduce the value of the loss function L(y, f(x)) which is defined in Eq. (6). Finally, the general gradient boosting algorithm formula which can be obtained as in Eq. (7).

$$\widehat{F}(x) = \operatorname{argmin}_{f} E_{x,y}[L(y, f(x))]$$
(6)

$$\left\{\gamma_m h_m\right\} = \operatorname{argmin} \sum_{m=1}^{M} L(y_i, f^{(m-1)}(x_i) + \gamma_m h_m(x_i))$$
(7)

III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

In this section, we discuss the evaluation of our model as well as the data training. How we get the data and the feature set used are explained.

A. Dataset Source

Tools used for the attack traffic are SlowLoris, GoldenEye, and Hping3. SlowLoris and GoldenEye are both Slow DDOS attacks. These types of attacks exploit the HTTP processing attribute of a web server by maintaining a connection until a HTTP request is completed, and the attacker uses a compromised host to establish a number of connections to the web server and makes the web server unavailable by continuing to send incomplete HTTP requests via each connection [34]. This Slow DDOS or commonly called Low-rate Distributed Denial-of-Service (LDDoS), is a recent evolution of DDoS attack that has emerged as one of the most serious vulnerabilities for the Internet, cloud computing platforms, the Internet of Things (IoT), and large data centers [35].

Meanwhile, Hping3 will be used to send SYN flood attack to exploit the TCP protocol 3-way handshake. For the benign traffic we use TRex with 3 different profiles. Data collection is done by generating packets alternately for all attack tools and profiles from TRex. Each session will generate traffic for 1 hour. Within 1 hour, Prometheus get the data from sFlow-RT with 1 minute and 1 second interval configuration. The process of how the data is collected can be seen in Fig 5. In the labeling for two classes label 0 is normal traffic while label 1 is DDOS attack trafic. For three clasees label 0 is normal traffic, label 1 is Slowloris and GoldenEye attack traffic, label 2 is Hping3 attack traffic. Slowloris and GoldenEye are included in the HTTP DDoS Attack (Application Layer Attack) labeled 1 while Hping3 is the TCP SYN Attack (Protocol Layer Attack) labeled 2. The amount of data for each class in the dataset present in Table I. Dataset will split into training and testing set with the proportion of sharing 80% and 20%, respectively.

TRex configuration for generating benign packets using 3 different profiles. This profile determines what types of traffic and how much traffic is sent. A PCAP file determines the type of traffic, TRex then read the pcap and generate with the rate of the traffic as in the Connection Per Second (CPS) value.

With this scheme TRex could be used for custom traffic generation, simply capture the packet to a PCAP file then define the profile. The first and second profile are called SFR Full and SFR Full 2K. TRex provides both of those profiles in package including the PCAP file. The profiles are defined to meet the IMIX (Internet MIX) [31] testing profile or a mixture of internet traffic. Network equipment vendors use IMIX profiles to simulate real-world traffic patterns and packet distribution. IMIX profiles are based on statistical sampling performed on Internet routers.

Meanwhile the third profile is custom profile. The SFR Full and SFR 2k profiles are more dominant for packet streaming. In the real world, the most packets are for streaming, both streaming for video access and video calls. Therefore, to balance the data in dataset, a custom profile is made from the modified SFR profile. Using the PCAP provided in the package, the thing needs to done is only customize the CPS. For the detail of each profile can be seen in Table II and Fig. 5.

| TABLE II |
|---------------|
| TREX PROFILES |

| | Connection per Second (CPS) | | | | | |
|---------------|-----------------------------|----------------|---------------|--|--|--|
| Traffic | SFR Full | SFR Full 2k | SFR Custom | | | |
| HTTP GET | 102 | 404.52 | 404.52 | | | |
| HTTP POST | 102 | 404.52 | 404.52 | | | |
| HTTPS | 33 | 130.87 | 130.87 | | | |
| HTTP Browsing | 179 | 709.89 | 709.89 | | | |
| Mail Exchange | 64 | 253.81 | 25.81 | | | |

| POP Mail | 1.2 | 4.759 | 9.759 |
|----------------|------|--------|-------|
| POP Mail (Port | 1.2 | 4.759 | - |
| 111) | | | |
| POP Mail (Port | 1.2 | 4.759 | - |
| 112) | | | |
| Oracle | 20 | 79.31 | 79.31 |
| RTP 160k | 0.7 | 2.776 | - |
| RTP 250k | 0.5 | 1.982 | - |
| SMTP | 1.85 | 7.33 | 1.85 |
| SMTP (Port 26) | 1.85 | 7.33 | 1.85 |
| SMTP (Port 27) | 1.85 | 7.33 | 1.85 |
| Video Call | 3 | 24 | 1.7 |
| Video Call RTP | 7.4 | 29.347 | - |
| Citrix | 11 | 43.62 | 7 |
| DNS | 498 | 417 | 498.0 |
| SIP | 7.4 | 29.34 | 5.4 |
| RSTP | 1.2 | 4.8 | 2.2 |




Fig. 5 Data gathering from sFlow

TABLE III Evaluation results

| | | Random Forest | | | | port Vector Machine | | | Extreme Gradient Boosting | | | |
|-------------------------|-------|---------------|-------|-------|-------|---------------------|-------|-------|---------------------------|-------|-------|-------|
| Train Dataset | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 |
| Dataset Test Accuracy | 99.59 | 99.67 | 99.81 | 99.81 | 99.59 | 98.45 | 99.47 | 99.48 | 99.75 | 99.75 | 99.84 | 99.84 |
| Realtime Test Accuracy | 98.60 | 99.65 | 99.80 | 99.84 | 99.43 | 95.22 | 99.82 | 99.88 | 99.55 | 99.72 | 99.90 | 99.78 |
| Dataset Test Precision | 99.82 | 99.80 | 99.81 | 99.83 | 99.46 | 98.02 | 99.47 | 99.52 | 100 | 99.85 | 99.84 | 99.86 |
| Realtime Test Precision | 98.27 | 99.77 | 99.94 | 99.90 | 99.28 | 95.39 | 99.95 | 99.91 | 99.76 | 99.82 | 100 | 99.82 |
| Dataset Test Recall | 99.28 | 99.60 | 99.81 | 99.85 | 99.64 | 97.96 | 99.47 | 99.56 | 99.46 | 99.70 | 99.84 | 99.87 |
| Realtime Test Recall | 99.18 | 99.61 | 99.67 | 99.83 | 99.53 | 91.07 | 99.68 | 99.85 | 99.33 | 99.71 | 99.78 | 99.76 |
| Dataset Test F1 | 99.55 | 99.70 | 99.81 | 99.84 | 99.55 | 97.98 | 99.47 | 99.54 | 99.73 | 99.77 | 99.84 | 99.86 |
| Realtime Test F1 | 98.72 | 99.69 | 99.80 | 99.86 | 99.40 | 92.57 | 99.81 | 99.88 | 99.55 | 99.76 | 99.89 | 99.79 |

To evaluate the model, along with test set from the dataset we evaluate from the real-time data. Real-time data is obtained by generating data with the tool. While the tools generating data, the sampling results from sFlow-RT is stored by Prometheus. At the same time data can be retrieved the data from Prometheus. The data from Prometheus then classified directly by the machine learning model. For realtime testing, the data is taken every second for 1 minutes, 5 minutes, and 10 minutes respectively for each tools. The classification output of the model is saved and evaluated. Because the data source is come from sFlow, the dataset features are closely related to sFlow capabilities to sampling the traffic packets. Different device version might has different capability of the sFlow Agent to sample the traffic flow. Here we determine the suitable features we can use to classify the traffic-the features used in this paper as shown in Table IV.

Common features such as IP Source, IP Destination, and Time to Live (TTL) could be use also as it is supported in sFlow. However, it is irrelevant for data modelling as it will change in different network topology and scenarios.

| TABLE IV The dataset features | | | | | |
|----------------------------------|---|--|--|--|--|
| Feature | Description | | | | |
| ipflags | IP Flags in binary (3-bit) | | | | |
| sourceport | Source port | | | | |
| destinationport | Destination port | | | | |
| ipbytes | IP packet size in bytes | | | | |
| frames | Frame per sampling | | | | |
| ipprotocol | Type of ip protocol. Eg. 6 for TCP, 17 for UDP. | | | | |
| tcpflags | TCP Flags in binary (8-bit) | | | | |
| payload | Payload size in bytes | | | | |
| bytes | Packet request size in bytes | | | | |
| frame | Number of frames from flow sampling | | | | |

B. Detection Results and Analysis

In this section, we discuss the results of classification using XGBoost and compared it with two other machine learning algorithms, Random Forest and Support Vector Machine (SVM). The main comparison measures are classification accuracy, precision, recall and F1. The evaluation also compares the real-time data with test set result.

| BEST PARAMETERS FOR EACH ALGORITHM | | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------------|--------|------|------|--|--|--|
| Algorithm | Danamatan | Best Parameter Value | | | | | | |
| | Parameter | D1 | D2 | D3 | D4 | | | |
| SVM | Kernel | poly | poly | poly | poly | | | |
| | С | 5 | 15 | 10 | 10 | | | |
| DE | N Estimator | 75 | 50 | 75 | 100 | | | |
| RF | Max Feature | sqrt | sqrt | log2 | auto | | | |
| XGB | N Estimator | 100 | 25 | 75 | 100 | | | |
| | Learning Rate | 0.1 | 1 | 0.5 | 0.75 | | | |
| | Tree Method | approx | approx | auto | auto | | | |

TABLE V Best parameters for each algorithm

Each algorithm is trained with all four datasets. In each training, GridsearchCV will find the best parameters of the algorithm. Cross validation for GridsearchCV is set to 5-fold. There are different parameters for each algorithm.

For Random Forest, hyperparameter used to find the best combination of parameters are as follow:

- N Estimator: 25,50,75, and 100
- Max Feature: sqrt, log2, and auto

For Support Vector Machine, hyperparameter used are as follow:

- Kernel: Linear, RBF, and Polynomial
- C: 0.1, 0.5, 1, 5, and 10

For Xtreme Gradient Boosting, hyperparameter used are as follow:

- N Estimator: 25, 50, 75, and 100
- Learning Rate: 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.75, and 1
- Tree Method: auto, exact, approx, hist, and gpu_hist

To find the best parameters of each algorithm GridsearchCV try each parameter combination and do training and cross validation. The result in Table III is the score of the best parameter. For the best parameters of each dataset can be seen in Table V.

As shown in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7, each dataset for each algorithm has an accuracy value above 99%, except for the Support Vector Machine with Dataset 2 which has 98,45%. The Support Vector Machine has decreased with Dataset 2 with 3 classes, but in Dataset 4 which also has 3 classes SVM get accuracy score above 99%. It means SVM with a smaller number of sample data has an impact on classification performance. The unseen data could not be classified correctly by SVM. The unseen data exist because in the Dataset 2 Prometheus pooling interval are set for 1 minutes. The data in intervals of one minute may be different from the next minute. The SVM with the hyperplane made was not able to handle it. On the other hand, both ensemble learning algorithms with a decision tree basis i.e. Random Forest and XGB, can actually handle it. By increasing the amount of training data can also increase the accuracy of the Random Forest and XGB algorithms. XGBoost has the highest accuracy with Dataset 3 and 4 training set with 99,84% accuracy score followed by Random Forest with 99,81% for the same dataset.




Fig. 6 Accuracy result from dataset test




Fig. 7 Accuracy comparison from real-time test and dataset test results

Furthermore, the detail of evaluation shown in Table III. The values of precision, recall, and F1 displayed in the table are the average value of all classes. Overall, the Xtreme Gradient Boosting algorithm get the highest score among other algorithms for each dataset. Extreme Gradient Boosting Algorithm in terms of accuracy is also quite stable for each dataset. Even for classification with 3 classes this algorithm has better scores than classification with 2 classes. This can be interpreted that the data is indeed more suitable to be categorized into three categories. Hping3 attack traffic, a Protocol Layer Attack category, is better to be separated from SlowLoris and GoldenEye attacks, which are Application Layer Attack categories.

As in Table III, most algorithms have insignificant differences between tests using datasets and real-time data. This means that most classification models can be applied to real-time traffic classification. As shown in Fig 7, the biggest difference in the test result is the Support Vector Machine algorithm with Dataset 2. SVM has the worst results than other algorithms for classifying three classes with the low amount of data. The difference between real-time test and dataset test for SVM with Dataset 2 also the highest, indicating that the model is not robust when applied to traffic classification in real time. This high difference is because during the real-time test Prometheus interval pooling configuration is set at 1 second while the training data from Dataset 2 is data taken every 1 minute. SVM cannot perform with the Dataset 2 test, it is intended with real-time data will be worse as they will be more unseen data while classifying the traffic. Other than SVM, Random Forest and Xtreme Gradient boosting has similar results between dataset and real-time tests. Both algorithms have excellent performance in multiple class classifications even with the less data training data.

IV. CONCLUSION

This research shows that sFlow can be used as a data source without any extract module. Sflow-RT and Prometheus are works together to provides real-time data. The data sampling result is consistent according to the real-time data test compared to dataset test. The best classification model for DDOS attack detection on SDN in this study is using the Xtreme Gradient Boosting algorithm with training set Dataset 4. From the test results, Dataset 4 with 3 classes has the most optimal results for each algorithm. The classification model using a combination of XGBoost - Dataset 4 has an accuracy of 99,84% for test with a test set from the dataset and 99,78% with real-time data. With Dataset 4 also, SVM and Random Forest has lower results with 99,48% and 99,81% accuracy, respectively. XGB and Random Forest are extremely stable for all dataset with two or three classes. Lower amount of the data in dataset still has a good result for XGB and Random Forest, but apparently it is not for SVM. The ensemble learning algorithm worked very well in this study. Both boosting and bagging method with the Decision Tree base are performing well for the classification. Binary classification with SVM has pretty good results, but for multiclass classification SVM requires more data to perform better.

For the further research, it is suggested to compare with other learning algorithm with the difference approach. The other suggestion is to make a mitigation action to counter the DDOS with the proposed method in this study. There is a potential to create a machine learning based framework for mitigating the DDOS attack as all the server applications run in a Docker Container. This will make the implementation modular and fast to deploy. For a large scale of the implementation a benchmark would be a great research. The dataset used in this study can also be used for similar research that use sFlow as a data source.

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